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INTRODUCTION 
KATE BRONFENBRENNER 
On February 9, 2006, more than 560 representatives from unions, union 
federations, academia, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) from 
around the world gathered at the Crowne Plaza Hotel in New York City for 
the "Global Companies-Global Unions-Global Research-Global Campaigns" 
conference. The overall goal of the conference was to strengthen labor's capac-
ity to conduct more effective strategic corporate research and run more effec-
tive comprehensive cross-border campaigns against the world's largest trans-
national firms. Yet perhaps the theme of the conference was best summed up 
by AFL-CIO secretary treasurer Richard Trumka in his remarks in the opening 
plenary: 
Brothers and Sisters, I like the theme of this conference because it lays out 
the challenges before us in almost biblical terms—global companies begat 
global problems for workers—global problems begat the need for global 
unions—and if global unions want to truly match the might and power 
of global corporations we have to undertake global research and global 
campaigns. (Trumka 2006) 
Unions around the world continue to operate in an ever-more complex 
and rapidly changing corporate environment. Increasingly the employers they 
face across the bargaining table or in organizing campaigns are part of dif-
fuse transnational companies that have minimal loyalty to any single indus-
try, product, or country. At the same time, never before have the ties between 
governments and supragovernmental institutions such as the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), the European Union (EU), or the World Bank been 
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more closely integrated with the interests of the world's largest transnational 
corporations than they are now. In today's environment, large sectors of the 
public have come to believe that Wal-Mart is unstoppable in leading the pur-
suit of a worldwide race to the bottom. On this issue there is little difference 
between workers in North Carolina who watch their jobs move to Mexico and 
those in Ireland who watch their jobs go to India or in China who lose their 
jobs to Vietnam {Bronfenbrenner and Luce 2004). They only need look at 
Oscar-nominated films such as Syriana or The Constant Gardener to find out 
what happens to those who dare to challenge capital when it is in cahoots with 
the highest levels of government, 
However, this is just one piece of the story. In the real world not every effort 
to fight back against the forces of global capital ends in devastating defeat. The 
more than 560 people gathered in New York in February demonstrated that 
there is a strategic front uniting against the combined power of the neoliberal 
state and transnational corporations. The labor movement and its allies have 
done battle with some of the most powerful transnational firms and govern-
ments and won. They can do it again, but only if they understand the power 
structure and vulnerabilities of these new kinds of corporations, the extent 
of their operations, and the relationships they have with their stakeholders. 
Equally important, they will succeed only if they build a global labor move-
ment based on equality and respect through cross-border campaigns. It will 
be critical to involve unions and NGOs locally, nationally, and internationally. 
The Global Unions Conference and this book, which came out of the confer-
ence, address these challenges. 
A Historic Perspective 
In 1986, the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA), under the leadership 
of its new young president, Richard Trumka, joined with the National Union 
of Mineworkers (NUM), other South African unions, the Free South Africa 
Movement (FSAM), and the rest of the U.S. labor movement to unleash 
a worldwide campaign against oil companies operating in South Africa, 
with Royal Dutch/Shell as the first target of a global boycott (Walker 1986; 
Multinational Monitor 1986). 
Shell was not chosen randomly as the target by either the South African 
or the U.S. unions. Oil companies were the focus of the boycott because oil 
was critical to the South African economy; the military and the police, for 
example, depended on oil to break strikes and crush demonstrations. Hav-
ing no indigenous supplies of oil to rely on, the South African regime was 
wholly dependent on the big oil companies for its very survival. Royal Dutch/ 
Shell in particular stood out as a target because it had continued to ignore 
pressure from the United Nations' 
oil to South Africa, but also becaust 
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pressure from the United Nations' voluntary oil embargo to stop supplying 
oil to South Africa, but also because it had a long history of serious health and 
safety violations and antiunion actions in its mines and refineries in South 
Africa {Multinational Monitor 1986; Knight 2001). The fact that two of its 
coal subsidiaries, Shell SA's Reitspruit and Shell USA's A.T. Massey, had just 
been involved in two brutal strikes involving the UMWA and NUM provided 
additional grounds for making Shell a key target (Walker 1986). 
The global campaign against Shell was perhaps the most comprehensive 
and most effective example of cross-border solidarity of Jabor and its allies 
in history. Unions, antiapartheid groups, churches, civil rights organizations, 
and social justice NGOs from around the world came together in common 
cause not out of their own self-interest but to make clear to the world's largest 
transnational firms that they were going to make the cost of doing business 
with South Africa prohibitive and the costs to the South African apartheid 
government even greater. Profits were cut and businesses withdrew. Some 
corporations, such as Mobil Oil, pulled out quickly; others, such as Shell, 
endured great costs but never left. But eventually the apartheid government 
could no longer withstand the combination of external pressure and escalat-
ing action by the black majority inside South Africa. What made the story 
even more remarkable was that it occurred during the period when much of 
the world's labor movement was still bitterly divided along cold-war lines. 
Despite the close ties between the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU), the African National Congress (ANC), and the Communist Party, 
not only unions such as the UMWA, the United Auto Workers (UAW), and 
the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees 
(AFSCME)—allied with TransAfrica and FSAM from early on—but the American 
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) en-
dorsed the Shell boycott as well (Knight 2001; Walker 1986). 
The boycott was active in more than a dozen countries, particularly in 
Royal Dutch/Shell's home countries of Britain and the Netherlands. While 
unions in Europe were not enthusiastic about the boycott tactic, most sup-
ported antiapartheid sanctions, including the oil embargo, and South Africa's 
nascent trade union movement in other ways. Seafarers' unions from several 
countries, for example, provided critical support for the oil embargo by help-
ing to track and to expose the global oil trade with South Africa. The Danish 
and Norwegian labor movements successfully convinced their governments 
to impose bans on oil transports and exports to South Africa (Hengeveld and 
Rodenburg 1995). 
There were unionized workers at oil companies in all countries affected, 
particularly in South Africa, who actively questioned the risks and benefits of 
the oil boycott (Baskin 1991). These were particularly important lessons to 
learn: global alliances and the long-term battle against transnational firms have 
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short-term costs that affect workers and unions differently in different coun-
tries. How to balance interests and identify common goals in this context can 
be the most difficult challenge for global campaigns. 
Without question, workers and their representatives around the world would 
be living and working in a very different environment if similar stories of co-
ordinated struggles had occurred during the last twenty years. Stopping the 
collusion of governments and transnational corporations in depriving work-
ers of fundamental political, social, and economic rights has become harder 
today because, unfortunately, labor did not learn this lesson from its involve-
ment in the South Africa divestment campaign. Instead of being emboldened 
to challenge global capital and construct a more united, progressive, and inter-
nationalist vision, in most cases organizations returned to their own struggles. 
Periodically one or another group asked for support in their individual contract 
or organizing struggles with employers, and different organizations stepped 
forward. The support, however, was sporadic and temporary. Some of those 
battles reached a truly global scale, such as the Steelworkers' struggle against 
Bridgestone Firestone to keep their union and hold on to pattern bargaining 
in the rubber industry, which ultimately involved solidarity actions in eighty-
three countries (Juravkh and Bronfenbrenner 2003). Another example was the 
successful campaign to organize 1,200 workers at Gina Bra Form Company in 
Thailand, which won support from the National Human Rights Commission 
of Thailand and from more than a dozen international union organizations, 
labor NGOs, and consumer and student solidarity organizations from around 
the globe (Robertson and Plaiyoowong 2004). 
Yet twenty years after the global labor movement launched its boycott 
against Royal Dutch/Shell, the world's largest corporations wield more power 
and are more globally connected and less fettered by global union solidar-
ity than they were in 1986. Now the challenges are greater. Where before 
transnational corporations seemed at least somewhat bounded by loyalty to 
product, firm, industry, or country, today the largest of these firms increas-
ingly supersede most government authority and are constrained only by the 
interests of their biggest investors, lenders, and shareholders. 
For too long most union members and their leaders tended to see their 
collective bargaining environment as truly limited by the national boundar-
ies of their own labor laws and the interests of their dues-paying members. 
Even as more of the employers they dealt with became foreign-owned or had 
foreign operations, and as nearly every industry in every part of the world 
was faced with having jobs outsourced from higher-wage countries to lower-
wage countries, unions continued to think of themselves as part of a national, 
not international, labor movement. There were noteworthy exceptions. In 
some cases, such as Ravenswood Aluminum Corporation or Chunghwa 
Telecom, these were defensive actions, in which local unions, with the help 
of national unions, global unit 
and international NGOs, moun 
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of national unions, global union federations (GUFs), and local, national, 
and international NGOs, mounted global campaigns to save the members' 
jobs and in many cases the union itself (Juravich and Bronfenbrenner 1999; 
Chang 2006). 
In contrast, other organizations have moved aggressively to build alliances 
as part of organizing campaigns. These include the AFL-CIO, Teamsters, and 
Union Network International (UNI), which supported a global campaign to 
organize workers at Quebecor in the United States, Europe, and Latin Amer-
ica (Trumka 2006; Brecher, Costello, and Smith 2006); the global organizing 
campaigns at Nestle and Coca-Cola by the International Union of Food, Agri-
cultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers'Associations 
(IUF) (Garver et al. 2006); and UNITE HERE's campaign to organize Pinault-
Printemps-Redoute (PPR) subsidiary Brylane (Clean Clothes Campaign 2002). 
But these campaigns have been few and far between. The greater capital's ca-
pacity to increase the power and speed with which it restructured its organi-
zation, the more difficult it was for labor to find its bearings. In the words of 
Hassan Yussuff from the Canadian Labor Congress, labor struggled to "match 
the other side's speed and mobility and capacity to change" (Yussuff 2006). 
Global Unions Conference 
In recent years there have been many in both the labor movement and aca-
demia who have been thinking and strategizing on just how labor can best 
meet the challenge it faces in organizing and bargaining with the world's larg-
est and most powerful transnational corporations. Starting in the fall of 2002 
a group of union leaders, union researchers and strategic campaigners, and 
labor scholars, led by Richard Trumka, now secretary treasurer of the AFL-
CIO; Bruce Raynor, president of UNITE HERE; Ron Blackwell, director of 
corporate affairs, AFL-CIO; and Kate Bronfenbrenner, Cornell ILR, came to-
gether to begin discussing these issues. This collaboration led to the Global 
Unions Conference in 2006. From the beginning its primary mission focused 
on improving labor's capacity to take on the world's largest transnational cor-
porations and shift global economic and political power back into the hands 
of workers and communities. The framework for our initial discussions grew 
from the following assumptions. 
First, there continued to be a severe shortage of individuals in the United 
States and around the world who were trained in strategic corporate research. 
Even those who were conducting research tended to use a simplistic model 
that failed to capture the complex and diffuse nature of corporate structure 
and ownership among the world's largest transnational employers. We now 
have developed a model for teaching strategic corporate research that better 
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captures the complex and changing character of these firms. The challenge, 
however, was how we could best disseminate our model to the widest audience 
possible. 
Second, most unions were not researching the employer they were dealing 
with in organizing or bargaining campaigns. While some industrial unions 
had run noteworthy cross-border campaigns when confronted with aggressive 
employer opposition at the bargaining table, such campaigns were rare in the 
organizing context and infrequent in the bargaining context, and were almost 
always defensive in nature. 
Third, even those campaigns that did exist were too often unilateral in 
nature, with the expectation that unions in other countries would come to 
the rescue of U.S. unions faced with tough foreign-owned transnational firms. 
U.S.-initiated campaigns to support organizing and bargaining by unions 
and workers in other countries were much less common. This problem was 
not limited to the United States. Unions engaged in struggles with employers 
in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and, to a lesser degree, western 
Europe, sought help from workers in the Global South or eastern Europe but 
did not reciprocate. 
Another critical tension developed among some unions in Europe over 
whether the comprehensive campaign model interfered with their own posi-
tive relationships with employers. At the same time, others in Europe wanted 
to link more with unions in North America and the Global South in these cam-
paigns as they watched the same employers that had been battling unions in 
North America begin to move toward privatization and shifting of union work 
out of western Europe toward eastern Europe and the Global South. Unions in 
the Global South continued to raise the question of how much workers in the 
Global North understood that their lifestyle and living standards depended on 
the continued degradation of living standards and environmental conditions 
in the South. 
Finally, there was an extreme shortage of quality academic research relating 
to all aspects of these questions, from the changing nature of corporate own-
ership structure and practices of the world's largest transnational firms to the 
extent and effectiveness of union responses to these changes in the structure 
and power of global capital. 
With these concerns in mind, the initial planning group reached out to the 
larger labor and academic community around the world in order to move 
forward with the planning process. In February 2006 this collaboration bore 
fruit, when the conference opened to a standing-room-only crowd, with reg-
istrants from fifty-three countries and six continents. The majority of the par-
ticipants were from outside the United States, and more than seventy came 
from the Global South, including fifty-seven whose travel was funded by con-
tributions from unions, universities, and NGOs supporting the conference. 
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Representatives from every GUF and many national trade union federations 
were in attendance. 
The conference also featured strategic research on ten key transnational 
corporations from diverse sectors and industries such as Wal-Mart, Alcoa, 
Starwood, Exxon Mobil, Kraft, and Sanofi-Aventis. These companies were the 
focus for discussions of both a strategic analysis of the structure and flow of 
corporate power within each company and how best to build and strengthen 
lasting cross-border networks among unions, scholars, and NGOs working 
with these target multinationals. 
One of the most important aspects of the conference was the effort made to 
ensure representation from the Global South for all ten target firms and the con-
nections that resulted from that effort between trade unionists from Europe and 
North America and trade unionists from Asia, Africa, and Latin America from 
the same company. However, this coming together of participants from the Global 
North and Global South was not limited to the target company sessions alone. 
It was a common thread in every part of the conference, from the plenary sessions 
to the workshops and panel presentations. In fact, this may have been the single 
most significant accomplishment of the conference and part of what made it such 
a historic event. In a time when global outsourcing has led too many workers and 
their unions to complain that seemingly undeserving workers in the Global South 
are stealing jobs that "rightfully" belong in North America or western Europe, this 
was one space where the framework for that debate had shifted to a common un-
derstanding that this was not a U.S. problem or a European problem but a global 
labor problem that could be solved only through a united effort. 
The large number of participants from unions from Europe and the full 
support from the GUFs also represented a significant change in the percep-
tion of where the European labor movement and GUFs stood on the issue 
of comprehensive cross-border campaigns. In fact, the sessions were filled 
with stories of unions in Europe beginning to link with one another and with 
unions in other countries, as employers with whom they had heretofore had a 
stable labor relationship were now engaging in large-scale cutbacks in jobs and 
demands for concessions in wages and social benefits. 
Representatives from every country denounced the growing power of 
neoliberal governments in the economic, political, environmental, and military 
arena and their oppressive impacts on workers, sacrificing their economic 
and democratic rights in the name of global capital. As Bertha Lujan, former 
national coordinator of Mexico's Authentic Labor Front (FAT), argued in her 
plenary speech, political struggles against neoliberal governments, such as the 
recent victory in Bolivia, are of equal importance in challenging capital. 
We need an ideological campaign so that we can be victorious over those 
who have power over us, and we can then become organized only in so far as 
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our organizations are strengthened, and each one of us needs to contribute 
our grain of sand so that we can have a new world at home, at our work-
place, in our country, in the world. (Lujan 2006) 
Organizing the conference involved surmounting enormous hurdles—fi-
nancial, geographic, and political. In fact from planning to fruition it would 
take four years. It was a historic event, not just because 560 trade unionists and 
academics came together to talk about how to take on global capital but spe-
cifically because of who was in the room. From around the world the people 
gathered there were representatives from unions, academia, and NGOs who 
were actively involved in either researching or conducting cross-border cam-
paigns with the world's largest transnational firms, a group that had never 
gathered in one place before. The conference, both inside and outside the for-
mal sessions, focused on a chance to share strategies, make connections, learn 
from one another, and build lasting networks for the future. For the three days 
of the conference the divisions that fell by the wayside were the split in the U.S. 
labor movement, the tensions over GUF protocols, and old cold-war legacies 
about which unions should be invited to the table. It felt as if a global labor 
movement was indeed possible. 
Compiling This Book 
The conference planners believed that one of the ways that trade union-
ists and academics were going to gain an objective understanding of how to 
best strengthen labor's capacity to mount more strategic, comprehensive, 
and effective cross-border campaigns was to generate more high-quality 
research on labor's efforts to date—both successful and unsuccessful—at 
running cross-border campaigns with transnational firms. Thus part of the 
conference-organizing process was a call for papers, sent out in English, 
French, and Spanish to scholars and trade unionists all over the world. The 
best papers would be published by Cornell University Press as part of an 
edited book. 
More than ninety-six paper proposals were submitted, and of those, fifty-
one were accepted for the conference. The subjects ranged from critical de-
bates on the role of IFAs to tactical questions on the use of the Internet in 
cross-border campaigns, as well as analyses of cross-border campaigns in spe-
cific industries such as logistics, auto, bananas, or the retail sector or in spe-
cific countries such as Thailand, India, or China. Prior to the conference, the 
literature on global unions consisted of a handful of books and articles. By the 
end of the conference, for the first time, there was a body of original research 
relating to global comprehensive cross-border campaigns. 
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As editor, my challenge was to put together a book that would do the best 
job of moving forward the goals and themes upon which the conference was 
based. That meant, first of all, presenting the model of strategic corporate 
research and comprehensive campaigns that had provided the theoretical 
framework for the entire conference. Second, the collection would need to 
capture the challenges of running comprehensive cross-border campaigns 
in the current global environment as well as the range of innovative strate-
gies that unions have attempted to use to adapt to different circumstances, 
industries, countries, and corporations. Finally the chapters had to commu-
nicate the global character of comprehensive cross-border organizing and 
bargaining campaigns. My goal was a book that included original research 
from scholars around the world on cross-border campaigns involving differ-
ent companies, industries, regions, and sectors that took place, for the most 
part, outside the United States. 
The book starts with a chapter by Tom Juravich that describes the evolution 
of the theoretical framework and model for strategic corporate research and 
comprehensive campaigns upon which the conference was based (and the 
model that was used to prepare the research reports on the ten target compa-
nies for the conference). Juravich not only provides a detailed road map for 
understanding how power flows in the more diffuse and complex structures 
that dominate the transnational landscape today but also lays out a framework 
for moving from research to a critique of the company and identifying profit 
centers, growth strategies, decision makers, and the key relationships that then 
become the multiple points of leverage upon which comprehensive campaigns 
are built. 
The nine chapters that followprovide a cross section of examples of compre-
hensive cross-border campaigns in different kinds of industries, corporations, 
regions, and circumstances. Each is distinct because each campaign was en-
tirely different from all the others, with no overlap in either company or union 
characteristics or in industry. Yet in combination they provide a full picture 
of the range of strategic responses that unions are using in trying to develop a 
more global response to a complex world economy. The common thread for 
each of the campaigns is that in each case the unions involved had to tailor their 
campaign to adjust to the unique environment in which they were operating. 
The first three chapters cover three very different campaigns in Asia—work-
ers in a medical supply company in Malaysia, Unilever workers in India, and 
women apparel workers in Sri Lanka. In chapter 2, Peter Wad tells the story 
of how the workers at a Malaysia medical supply company were able to orga-
nize a union in their factory through an alliance with a Danish NGO that was 
dominated by the Danish labor movement rather than through the expected 
route of using pressure from the unionized workers at the heavily unionized 
company headquarters of APM-Maersk in Denmark. This example not only 
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captures the largely untold story of links between unions organizing in the 
Global South and unions in Europe but also demonstrates how the model pre-
sented in chapter 1 will require the development of a unique strategy depend-
ing on the differing vulnerabilities of the company, and how alliances with 
other stakeholders can best be utilized in exerting pressure on the firm. 
The challenge of alliance building between unions in the Global South and 
those in the Global North is given some historical context by Ashwini Suk-
thankar and Kevin Kolben in chapter 3. They remind us that even in the earli-
est days of colonial India, labor struggles had a cross-border consciousness. 
Workers in India protested issues such as the establishment of a subcontract-
ing employment system because it led to absent and unaccountable employers. 
More currently, as they argue in their two case studies of Unilever subsidiar-
ies, cross-border campaigns are most effective when the strategies are largely 
shaped by the issues and interests of Indian unions and consumers rather 
than decided top down by northern unions and NGOs. Only then can they 
overcome the negative legacy of job protectionism from Europe and North 
America and the sense among many Indian trade unionists that the emphasis 
of northern unions and NGOs on corporate social responsibility often ends 
up being offered as an alternative to unionization. 
Using data collected through participant observation research while she 
worked as an apparel worker in an export processing zone (EPZ) apparel fac-
tory in Sri Lanka for eleven months in 2003, Samanthi Gunawardana tells, 
in the voices of the workers themselves, how even in the most hostile of 
environments, workers can and do organize through cross-border compre-
hensive campaigns (chapter 4). Victory did not come easily but in stages. First, 
women-to-women networks grew out of the women's common identity as 
EPZ workers and the multiple problems they faced in the workplace and in 
their living situation. Then the women began coalition building with local 
NGOs, which was then followed step by step by national and international 
labor and NGOs from around the world. Gunawardana argues that in this 
kind of environment these worker-to-worker networks, nationally and inter-
nationally, are necessary for success. Given that between 2003 and 2006 the 
number of unionized workers in the Sri Lankan EPZs grew from six thousand 
to fourteen thousand, this appears to be a strategy worth heeding. 
The book then switches gears by moving to a campaign on a very different 
scale in the banana sector in Latin America and the Caribbean. Here Henry 
Frundt presents union comprehensive campaigns at a much more advanced 
level. He explains how the banana unions used a combination of cross-border 
strategies to increase or rebuild union density and strengthen bargaining 
power, not just in one company in one country but in multiple transnational 
firms throughout the banana sector in Latin America and the Caribbean (chap-
ter 5). As Frundt describes, not only did the banana unions utilize multiple 
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coalitions with small farmer associations, European and North American 
NGOs, and the IUF, but they also employed a diversity of strategies. These 
ranged from directly negotiating with transnational banana firms for both 
local contracts and IFAs to challenging international trade policies that ad-
versely impact banana workers. The banana unions have also worked to es-
tablish independent certification programs and Fair Trade Labeling programs 
that recognize organizing and collective bargaining rights as well as social and 
environmental standards. 
The next three chapters focus on three campaigns in Europe involving dock-
workers and General Motors workers Europe-wide, and the Service Employ-
ees International Union (SEIU)-Transport and General Workers Union(T&G) 
campaign with school bus drivers in the United Kingdom. The dockworkers, 
or dockers, the focus of Peter Turnbull's research in chapter 6, may have one 
of the longest traditions of cross-border solidarity of any industry, since in-
ternational linkages are a natural outgrowth of the work process in marine 
shipping. However, Turnbull's research focuses on cross-border campaigns 
strictly within the EU context—namely, the response of European dockers 
to directives issued by the European Commission in 2001 and 2006, both of 
which seriously threatened job security, social benefits, and union power on 
the docks across Europe. In what would be called the "war on Europe's wa-
terfront," docker unions and the International Transport Federation (ITF) 
launched a campaign of demonstrations, strikes, and coordinated workplace 
education and action across Europe to get the first directive voted down in 
an unexpected victory for the dockers in 2003. This was followed by a more 
nuanced but equally successful campaign of lobbying and legislative action in 
2004-6 backed up by the threat of the capacity to strike. As Turnbull explains, 
the European dockers' story is a lesson in how unions can adapt to the chang-
ing political and economic environment, in this case the EU, by developing 
new "repertoires of contention" to tilt the balance of power away from trans-
national capital. 
Valeria Pulignano provides a critical analysis of how the European Metal 
Workers' Federation, absent any historical tradition of cross-border bargaining 
or organizing, worked to coordinate workplace and community actions across 
borders throughout Europe in response to the recent wave of corporate restruc-
turing and threats of plant closings, job loss, and cutbacks in wages and benefits 
at GM and its subsidiaries (chapter 7). She describes how unions were able to 
coordinate activity across borders to restrain, but not prevent, GM from forc-
ing locals and regions to compete against each other to save jobs in their com-
munities. Pulignano argues that the GM case suggests that union bargaining 
power in a restructured Europe depends on moving from national to European 
bargaining structures and coupling this process with constant communication 
and linkages across borders at every level of the trade union movement. 
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Amanda Tattersall explores the challenges and possibilities of attempting 
cross-border alliances in the service sector through her analysis of SEIU's global 
partnerships unit and the Driving Up Standards campaign between SEIU and 
the T&G in the United Kingdom from 2004 to 2006. Chapter 8 explores the 
structural innovation of the global partnerships unit and draws out the pos-
sibilities and difficulties for this form of global union collaboration. Tattersall 
notes the strengths of the campaign—its success in global coalition building 
to stop employers in the United Kingdom and Europe from treating their U.S. 
employees and unions differently than they treat those in their headquarters 
countries. She also points out that there are some significant limitations in 
the current practice of the Driving Up Standards campaign that provide im-
portant lessons for effective global partnerships. Using criteria developed for 
evaluating the effectiveness of labor-community coalitions, Tattersall found 
that obstacles to global union collaboration can arise where there is a lack 
of clear-cut mutual interests, distinct differences in practice and organizing 
style between the two unions, and uneven partnership in decision making. 
Still, given the lack of cross-border organizing in the service sector, the global 
partnerships unit offers significant opportunities for future endeavors, where 
SEIU and other unions can build on this initiative to create more mutual part-
nerships and effective campaigns in the future. 
In chapter 9 Dimitris Stevis and Terry Boswell address the opportunities 
and limitations that International Framework Agreements (IFAs) and other 
IFA-like global agreements provide unions when taking on large transnation-
al corporations. As Stevis and Boswell explain, these global agreements are a 
fairly recent and primarily European phenomenon that many GUFs and Eu-
ropean national unions see as their most significant accomplishments. Some 
even consider them to be the closest the labor movement has gotten to truly 
global negotiations with the world's largest transnational corporations. Those 
with a more critical view of IFAs, including many national union federations 
and national unions outside Europe, emphasize IFAs as unenforceable agree-
ments that are almost entirely concentrated in European countries. At best 
IFAs can be one element in a multifaceted comprehensive cross-border cam-
paign, but at worst they can be used by employers to co-opt or undermine the 
union campaign. Stevis and Boswell contend that the answer is to address the 
limitations of IFAs by making them truly global and enforceable and by also 
empowering GUFs to act more like real global unions, suggestions that are also 
emerging from the IUF's review of the effectiveness of IFAs. 
Finally the last chapter, by Darryn Snell, looks at the true outlaws among 
the world's largest transnational corporations. These include firms that have 
been charged with direct involvement in a wide range of human rights viola-
tions in the Global South, such as mass executions, rape, torture, forced la-
bor, forced relocation of indigenous populations, and active involvement in 
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or direct support for military operations ranging from toppling governments 
to crushing rebellions. This group also encompasses those who are charged 
with more indirect involvement with human rights abuses because of their 
failure to do anything to correct or prevent the conflicts and human rights 
violations that are occurring around them. Snell looks first at how NGOs and 
trade unions have worked together to investigate and prove the extent of hu-
man rights abuses taking place and then at how they have held corporations 
accountable through lawsuits, shareholder actions, boycotts and divestment 
campaigns, and developing codes of conduct. As Snell points out, none of these 
are simple, because many companies that NGOs may target for a financially 
damaging lawsuit, a boycott, or divestment, may have large numbers of union-
ized facilities in Europe or North America or in other countries in the Global 
South that could suffer severe hardship if these campaigns were successful. 
But as Snell concludes, partnering with NGOs to stop these abuses cannot be 
optional for the global labor movement. As in the fight against apartheid, if 
unions do not put everything they have into a global challenge of these firms, 
then they have lost their moral standing. 
Building a Sustainable Global Network 
The third and final goal of the conference was to "lay the groundwork for 
building a sustainable global network of unions and academics to continue 
to work together to effectively engage transnational corporations worldwide." 
Certainly just holding the conference and allowing the connections to be made 
accomplished a big part of this goal, as does the conference website, which 
includes all the company research reports, video streaming of all the confer-
ence speeches, and copies of all the papers presented at the conference (see 
http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/globalunionsconference/). Yet in the end it is this 
edited book that the conference planners hope to have as the most lasting leg-
acy of the conference. We hope that it will be read by researchers and strategic 
campaigners from unions and NGOs around the world to help them critically 
analyze how their organizations could more effectively work together to take 
on transnational corporations in their industry or regions. We hope that it 
will also be read by labor scholars across many disciplines to encourage more 
and better research in both cross-border campaigns and the changing nature, 
structure, and practice of transnational corporations. We also hope that it will 
be read by young people in the labor movement and in universities and col-
leges around the world and will inspire them to work with unions and NGOs 
as part of the global effort to stop the race to the bottom. 
The lessons that can be learned from this book are the lessons that we hoped 
were learned from the conference itself. As Hassan Yussuff said in his closing 
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speech, the simplest lesson of all is that" [w] e need to meet like this more often. 
This kind of critical, collective reflection among researchers, activists, union 
staff and leaders produces formal and informal exchanges that are valuable 
for action" (Yussuff 2006). Unions and academics wrestling with these same 
core issues must find ways to come together on a much more frequent basis 
and must make the effort to raise the funds so that the north-south connec-
tions that were initiated at the conference are no longer the exception but the 
norm. 
We also desperately need more and better research from a much wider 
range of scholars, but even more important, we need more scholars to actively 
engage with the research issues raised by the themes of this conference. This 
includes more in-depth research focusing on every aspect of large transna-
tional firms, as well as both quantitative and qualitative cross-cultural research 
on employer and union strategies in organizing and bargaining in the global 
environment. I issue this challenge knowing full well the risks that are entailed 
in conducting research on powerful transnational corporations. But these are 
risks that we as scholars must take if there is to be an informed challenge to 
the neoliberal agenda. 
This book demonstrates how much further the labor movement needs to 
go in truly building a global labor movement. As Valeria Pugliano points out, 
unions in Europe are still in the nascent stages of understanding that they have 
more to gain as a united European labor movement than by putting their lo-
cal interests first. Unions from the Global North, particularly the GUFs, also 
must understand that IFAs and cross-border campaigns that do not take into 
consideration the interests and concerns of workers in the Global South are 
doomed to failure. 
Finally, unions can no longer afford to limit their cross-border activity to 
defensive actions. Strategies such as strategic corporate research, worker-to-
worker exchanges, global coalition building, and comprehensive campaigns 
need to become a constant in the organizing and bargaining relationship with 
these large transnational firms. Labor has an even greater capacity than capital 
to be globally connected because it can connect with workers at every level. 
Whether apparel workers in EPZ zones in Sri Lanka, dockworkers in Europe, 
or banana workers in Latin America, in the end, all the workers whose stories 
are told in this book took on capital and won by uniting, first with one an-
other, then with other unions and NGOs, and then with the world. As Hassan 
Yussuff reminded us, "we need to make it an automatic reflex to appreciate 
that global capital has its weaknesses. Too often ... the strengths have been 
emphasized. The weaknesses and failings are real. The focus on them reminds 
us hope should always be more convincing than despair" (2006). 
The chapters in this book make clear that unions have the capability to build 
the cross-border coalitions necessary to take on transnational corporations. 
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The question is whether they are willing to make the fundamental ideological 
and cultural changes necessary to make this happen on a global scale. If they 
are, then maybe it will be five, not twenty years before Wal-Mart is no longer 
driving the global race to the bottom; before firms such as Exxon Mobil, Coca-
Cola, Talisman, Caterpillar, and any number of large pharmaceutical compa-
nies will no longer be able to profess to be good corporate citizens in some 
countries and operate entirely outside the law in others. All of us who put so 
much work into the conference and into this volume did so because we believe 
that unions and their allies do have the capacity to change and become a global 
movement. But most important of all, we believe that with these changes, the 
balance of power, like the arc of history, will finally be tilting away from capital 
toward workers, their unions, and communities in both the Global North and 
Global South. 
1. BEATING GLOBAL CAPITAL 
A Framework and Method for Union Strategic 
Corporate Research and Campaigns 
TOM JURAVICH 
As unions in the United States struggle to survive in the face of the glo-
balization of firms combined with unprecedented employer opposition to 
unions, it is clear that new approaches, strategies, and tactics are imperative. 
The ways of organizing and bargaining forged during the labor-management 
accord in the 1950s and 1960s—approaches that relied heavily on the law 
and administrative proceduralism—simply have no place in this new reality, 
given the withdrawal of corporations from the accord and growing employer 
intransigence, as workers in the United States now find themselves on a world 
stage. If labor in the United States has any hope of remaining a source of power 
for working people on the job and in their communities, it must find a way to 
pick up the gauntlet thrown down by global capital in this new environment. 
One of the fundamental ways the labor movement in the United States is 
rising to this challenge is through strategic corporate research and the develop-
ment of comprehensive strategic campaigns in both organizing and collective 
bargaining. Sometimes referred to as simply strategic or coordinated campaigns, 
or by the older nomenclature of corporate campaigns, this approach recognizes 
that to be successful, unions need to gain a comprehensive understanding of the 
firm and the industry in which it is situated. Only as a product of this kind of 
research and analysis can unions design the appropriate strategies and tactics to 
be successful, taking into account both how power flows through the firm and 
how vulnerabilities can be exploited. The comprehensive strategic campaigns 
The author would like to thank Kate Bronfenbrenner, Darryn Snell, Teresa Healy, and two 
anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions, and Beth Berry for copyediting. 
that result go far beyond traditi 
creative and complex processes fi 
Over the past two decades w 
research and campaigns by unic 
to identify a major union victor; 
significant way employ strategi 
Ranging from the Service Empk 
Justice for Janitors campaign in 
International Brotherhood of 1 
1998) and the victory at Bridges 
and Bronfenbrenner 2003), unic 
can win, and win big, using thes< 
While this chapter is written f 
here that the use of strategic rest 
unions in the United States. Uni 
by global employers; over the last 
dustries were moved offshore anc 
gutted. As we will see, over a deca 
ing on strategic research and corr 
the emerging global giants. Work 
not the only ones to feel the ravag 
comprehensive campaigns are rel< 
In fact, in many ways workers ir 
lines in the struggles against glol 
early transnational enterprises cc 
for workers' rights in the banar 
(see Frundt chapter 5) and for w 
Korea in the 1970s (Soonok 2001 
Bolivian citizens to reclaim their 
social movements, a number of c 
using sophisticated strategic rese 
servatory, a nongovernmental or 
the Brazilian labor movement, d< 
mines produced materials for the 
destine shops supplied apparel f 
2006). And while the social, poli 
different, there is a growing syner 
sive campaigns in the United Sta 
The situation in western Euro 
their specific industrial relations 
tutional voice for unions.on wc 
shored up in European Union 
BEATING GLOBAL CAPITAL 17 
that result go far beyond traditional organizing and bargaining and develop 
creative and complex processes that pressure firms in a multitude of ways. 
Over the past two decades we have watched the maturation of strategic 
research and campaigns by unions in the United States. Indeed, it is difficult 
to identify a major union victory during the past decade that did not in some 
significant way employ strategic research and a comprehensive campaign. 
Ranging from the Service Employees International Union (SEIU)'s successful 
Justice for Janitors campaign in Los Angeles (Waldinger et al. 1998) to the 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters' victory at UPS (Witt and Wilson 
1998) and the victory at Bridgestone/Firestone by the Steelworkers (Juravich 
and Bronfenbrenner 2003), unions in the United States have shown how they 
can win, and win big, using these approaches. 
While this chapter is written from a U.S. perspective, it is important to note 
here that the use of strategic research and campaigns is not just a story about 
unions in the United States. Unions in the United States took a frontal attack 
by global employers; over the last three decades they have watched as entire in-
dustries were moved offshore and outsourced and an industrial relations system 
gutted. As we will see, over a decade of experimentation, U.S. unions began rely-
ing on strategic research and comprehensive campaigns to gain traction against 
the emerging global giants. Workers and their unions in the United States were 
not the only ones to feel the ravages of globalization, however, and these types of 
comprehensive campaigns are relevant responses not just for U.S.-based unions. 
In fact, in many ways workers in the Global South have always been on the front 
lines in the struggles against global firms. Rooted in the legacy of colonialism, 
early transnational enterprises continued this oppression, spawning campaigns 
for workers' rights in the banana industry in the 1950s in Central America 
(see Frundt chapter 5) and for women textile workers in the "peace market" in 
Korea in the 1970s (Soonok 2003) and leading to the more recent struggles by 
Bolivian citizens to reclaim their water system (Schultz 2005). While rooted in 
social movements, a number of campaigns in the Global South are increasingly 
using sophisticated strategic research. For example, research by the Social Ob-
servatory, a nongovernmental organization (NGO) in Brazil, funded in part by 
the Brazilian labor movement, documented that children working in Brazilian 
mines produced materials for the British-based ICI (Goodwin 2006), and clan-
destine shops supplied apparel for a Dutch transnational (Social Observatory 
2006). And while the social, political, and economic contexts are indeed quite 
different, there is a growing synergy between strategic research and comprehen-
sive campaigns in the United States and throughout the Global South. 
The situation in western Europe has historically been quite different. While 
their specific industrial relations systems differ, many countries provide insti-
tutional voice for unions on works council or similar structures, provisions 
shored up in European Union (EU). law. Historically, this has meant that 
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labor-management relations have been considerably less adversarial than those 
in the United States. Given the presence of these institutions and European 
tradition, some have questioned the relevance of American-style strategic 
research and comprehensive campaigns for unions in the EU. Several factors, 
however, suggest that trade union practice in the EU may be changing. 
The first is the very integration of the EU. While unions had national-based 
institutions in place, the question is how they dovetail with larger EU struc-
tures (Hyman 2005). As Valeria Pulignano writes in chapter 7 of this book, 
"[0]ne of the factors limiting the capacity of the labor movement to coordi-
nate across borders is the difficulty in creating links between the European, 
the national, and the local levels of union structures." Her case study illustrates 
how this lack of coordination empowered General Motors' pitting of workers 
against one another across national boundaries. In contrast, Peter Turnbull 
(chapter 6) documents how dockworkers, in a sector with a long tradition 
of global solidarity, including in Europe, were much more effective in over-
coming national barriers and mounting a successful European-wide cross-
border campaign. Thus it remains to be seen how well traditional structures, 
now in flux as a result of EU integration, will constrain the behavior of global 
capital in Europe. It is in this context that European unionists are exploring 
the possibilities of strategic research and comprehensive campaigns. 
Despite these successful campaigns and the growing reliance by unions in 
the United States and around the world on these methods, there is a surpris-
ing lack of information on strategic research and its use in the development 
of strategic campaigns.1 One of the pioneers in training corporate research-
ers, the former Food and Allied Service Trades (FAST) Department of the 
AFL-CIO, for many years published its Manual of Corporate Investigation 
(FAST 2006). More recently a number of unions, such as SEIU and Ameri-
can Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), have 
provided basic guides to finding corporate information on the Internet. While 
these resources provide important sources of information, what is lacking is 
an overall research framework or primer for conducting strategic corporate 
research and applying it to strategic campaigns. 
1
 To some degree this lack of instructional materials by unions may be purposeful. As soon 
as these strategic campaigns started becoming successful, employers retaliated by filing lawsuits 
against unions for using them. For example, during the Ravenswood campaign by the Steelwork-
ers, the employer filed charges under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(RICO) against individual activists in the local union (Juravich and Bronfenbrenner 1999). The 
Steelworkers, along with several other unions, have been sued a number of times subsequently, 
with several suits hanging over the union for years at a time and employers using the deposition 
process to try to gain access to a wide range of union documents and information. Given this 
situation, unions have been reticent about preparing materials that could help them education-
ally but could be used against them in a court of law. 
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Similarly, the scholarly community has focused little attention on strategic 
research and campaigns. While there is some research about specific strategic 
campaigns (Brisbin 2002; Franklin 2002; Juravich and Bronfenbrenner 1999; 
Waldinger et al. 1998; Hickey 2004; Quan 2006; Witt and Wilson 1998), there 
have been few efforts to examine the theory or methods of strategic corpo-
rate research. The last issue of a journal dedicated to strategic research and 
campaigns was the 1993 issue of the Labor Research Review (1993). 
This chapter aims to fill this gap by providing a basic framework for conduct-
ing strategic corporate research, as well as describing how this research can be 
applied to the development of comprehensive campaigns in organizing and bar-
gaining. The model is designed to be applicable to a wide variety of employers 
and can be used by trade unionists and their allies at a number of different lev-
els. Before we begin exploring this model, it is important to step back and place 
comprehensive campaigns in a larger historical framework. As important as the 
techniques of corporate research are, we cannot understand them thoroughly 
without also exploring the evolution of comprehensive strategic campaigns. 
Corporate Power and Union Forms of Resistance 
While it is tempting to look at comprehensive campaigns as something en-
tirely new, in many ways they are the latest adaptation by labor to the changes 
in corporate structure and practice. If we look back at the history of the labor 
movement around the world, I would argue that labor has been successful 
when it develops forms of resistance that take into account how employers are 
structured and how they operate in the context of the state. While the recent 
development of comprehensive strategic campaigns is indeed innovative, these 
campaigns belong to a long line of strategic thinking by the labor movement. 
While we could trace the evolution of forms of resistance in a number of 
different countries, table 1.1 outlines the development of union strategies and 
tactics and their relationship to corporate structure in the United States by 
examining four employers over four different time periods. We begin in 1912 
in Lawrence, Massachusetts, with the American Woolen Company. American 
Woolen owned four of the major textile mills along the canals in Lawrence, 
a planned New England city on the banks of the Merrimack River. As was 
common in the textile industry in the later part of the nineteenth century and 
the early part of the twentieth century, the mills were single operations that 
served regional markets. Run by William Wood, American Woolen was what 
we would think of today as a limited partnership (Watson 2005,23). 
In this first part of the twentieth century, the financial community had yet 
to establish the kinds of credit systems that would allow firms to borrow funds. 
This led to boom-and-bust cycles in the New England textile mills, as well as in 
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TABLE 1.1. 
A historical analysis of corporate structure and successful forms of union resistance in the United States 
Corporate Stucture 
Production 
Distribution 
Financing 
Role of the state 
Union form of 
resistance 
American 
Woolen, 
Lawrence 
(1912) 
Single plant 
Regional 
Partnership 
No institutional 
involvement 
in labor 
issues 
Simple strike 
GM Flint 
(1937) 
Multiple plants 
National 
Early U.S.-
based 
corporation 
Increasing 
militancy 
Pressure on 
state 
Selective strike 
U.S. Steel (1965) 
Multiple plants 
Some international 
Mature U.S.-based 
corporation 
Heavily in 
tripartite IR 
system 
Pattern bargaining 
Bridgestone/ 
Firestone (1996) 
Global plants 
Fully inter-
national 
Global corpor-
ation 
Undermining of 
extant IR 
system 
Comprehensive 
campaign 
the larger economy. This meant that American Woolen, like every other firm, 
depended on a rapid turnover of its inventory to generate the cash to keep the 
company operating. 
In January 1912, the largely immigrant workforce of women, organized by 
the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), walked out of the Lawrence mills. 
In what many consider the first modern strike in the United States, the women 
marched and paraded through the streets of Lawrence, keeping workers 
from returning to work and effectively shutting down production (Juravich, 
Hartford, and Green 1996). By late March, the company, near economic ruin, 
capitulated to the strikers' demands. 
While there is a great deal more to the story of what has been called the 
"Bread and Roses" strike, what is important to our discussion here is that 
American Woolen's structure meant that the company could be brought to its 
knees by the withdrawal of labor in a simple strike—a strategy used through-
out the United States and around the world in the later part of the nineteenth 
and the early part of the twentieth century. This was a local strategy, one often 
based in craft unionism or unions at the local level. Without the ability of the 
company to shift production or to borrow funds, a simple work stoppage was 
an incredibly powerful weapon for labor. While there was no institutional role 
for the state in labor industrial relations, local law enforcement would often 
play a pivotal role in these disputes. 
Corporate structure changed, however, and along with it labor's form of 
resistance had to change, too. In the opening chapters of John Steinbeck's The 
Grapes of Wrath, Tom Joad, the main character of the novel, returns to his 
home to find that his family's farm has been bought out by a large corporation 
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and the family is moving west. As he goes out to the old place, he sees a large 
tractor tearing down the family's farm and barns. He threatens to kill the trac-
tor driver to stop the destruction. The driver responds, "Joad, they'll just hang 
you, but before you're hung, there'll be another guy on the tractor, and he'll 
bump the house down. You're not killing the right guy" (Steinbeck 1939,52). 
Over the next several paragraphs, Joad suggests that he should instead kill 
the guy giving the orders or the bank president and so on. But with each sug-
gestion the driver responds that it won't stop the destruction of the farms, 
valiantly trying to help Joad understand the nature of a modern corporation. 
This was not an operation controlled by one man, such as those run by mill 
owners of an earlier era, that could be stopped by the shooting of one man. 
Firms had changed, and union tactics would have to change as well if they 
were to be successful in this new milieu. 
General Motors was one of the early corporations that emerged in the 
1930s. Unlike American Woolen, it had a number of plants, many perform-
ing the same function, and serving not a regional but a national market. And, 
while financing was not as sophisticated as it is today, the corporate structure 
did allow for more cash flow to weather short-term downturns. Given these 
changes in corporate structure, the simple strikes used by the IWW in Law-
rence were no longer appropriate. If the United Auto Workers (UAW) struck 
an individual plant during its organizational drive, the work would have sim-
ply been shifted to another plant, the workers fired, and the union's drive set 
back on its heels. This happened throughout the 1930s and 1940s as workers 
and their unions still clung to the strategies of the earlier era, struggling fu-
tilely against different kinds of firms. 
In their campaign against General Motors, the UAW developed a strategy 
that anticipated this new corporate structure. From their research they knew 
that Fisher Body Plants 1 and 2 were the major suppliers of body parts for 
Chevrolets and Buicks (Lichtenstein 1995, 76). The union targeted these key 
plants and was planning a strike for January, after newly elected Michigan gov-
ernor Frank Murphy's inauguration. However, when rumors spread that cru-
cial dies were soon to be moved, local activists jumped the gun and initiated 
the famous sit-down strike that was fundamental to the UAW's wresting union 
recognition from General Motors (Zieger 1995, 50). 
While the sit-down feature of this strike was crucial, what is also significant 
about the Flint strike is that it was not a simple strike like the one at Lawrence 
but a selective or tactical strike that took into account the new corporate form. 
By targeting the Fisher plants, the UAW understood the vulnerabilities of GM 
and was able to take full advantage of them. At the same time, the role of the 
state in industrial relations was changing. Under pressure from growing labor 
militancy President Roosevelt had provided union recognition in section 7 of 
the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 (NIRA). By the time of the strike 
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in Flint, the more comprehensive Wagner Act was still in the courts, but the 
government was beginning a much deeper involvement in labor-management 
relations. 
Corporations in the United States continued to mature, and in the wake of 
the involvement of the U.S. labor movement in tripartite agreements during 
World War II, an industrial relations system arose (Kaufman 1992). For the 
first and only time in U.S. history, an accord emerged between labor and man-
agement, and a complex set of state-supported procedures was put in place in 
an effort to level the playing field between the two parties. At this point there 
was an explosion in the length of union contracts, far beyond the single page 
that marked the initial agreement between GM and the UAW, and the institu-
tion of complex, multistage grievance and arbitration processes. 
United States Steel emerged as one of the leading U.S. firms during this 
period, and it represented a further evolution of the corporation. Like GM it 
had a number of plants across the United States, distributing not only to the 
entire country but internationally as well (Hoerr 1988). United States Steel, 
along with the United Steelworkers of America (USWA), developed a complex 
set of rules governing the workplace, including a private arbitration system. 
The firm experienced rapid growth during the 1950s and 1960s and, with a 
command of the U.S. market, was hugely profitable. The evolution of both 
corporate law and banking further strengthened its economic security. 
Against such a stable firm, the labor movement was losing the power of selec-
tive strikes. Given the labor-management accord and the legal and regulatory 
framework in place, the Steelworkers, and much of the labor movement in the 
United States, moved instead in a different direction. In the steel, auto, and many 
other basic industries, the labor movement moved to pattern bargaining, nego-
tiating not with just one firm but with the major firms in an entire industry. 
Until the mid- to late 1970s unions were able to use pattern bargaining to 
deliver increasingly stronger contracts to union members in these core indus-
tries. It is, however, important to note here that these adaptations marked a 
significant departure for labor, constituting forms of acquiescence to the new 
industrial relations system rather than the forms of resistance of earlier eras. 
As long as the accord held, the system delivered, but by the late 1970s, when the 
U.S. economy came to a standstill, the accord began to unravel as employers 
such as International Paper and Phelps-Dodge took off their gloves. The legal 
and procedural framework that had once brought a measure of justice and se-
curity to workers in the United States was now an empty shell, openly ignored 
by the U.S. government. It became clear that labor would need to return to its 
past and once again develop new forms of resistance that made sense, given 
the new corporate order. 
Confronted with these new realities—plant closings, outsourcing, a new 
corporate adversarialism, and the failure of the postwar industrial relations 
system—the late 1970s and early 
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system—the late 1970s and early 1980s were a time of great loss of member-
ship in the labor movement in the United States. But it was also a time of great 
experimentation, as labor began to explore new approaches. 
One important innovation was the work of Ray Rogers in the late 1970s, 
with his development of the first corporate campaign at J.R Stevens, a notori-
ous antiunion firm located largely in the south. The textile workers' union 
had been unsuccessful for years in trying to break into Stevens, in what were 
essentially company towns. Rogers, a young union staffer, came up with an 
important alternative. Instead of going head to head against the company in its 
strongholds, the union would bring pressure on the firm indirectly by pressur-
ing members of the board of directors. By targeting key board members, Rog-
ers brought Stevens to the bargaining table, doing in a matter of months what 
on-the-ground organizing had been unable to accomplish for years (Pauly and 
Walcott 1978,58). 
During the 1980s, unions also reached back to their roots in the communi-
ties where they had been born and began experimenting with building com-
munity coalitions and community campaigns. One of the best examples was 
the campaign run by the United Electrical Workers (UE) at Morse Cutting 
Tool in New Bedford, Massachusetts (Swinney 1982). Morse had been bought 
by the behemoth Gulf and Western, which was threatening to shutter the fa-
cility. The UE worked tirelessly with the community in this small fishing and 
industrial city on the Massachusetts coast. The campaign culminated with the 
mayor of New Bedford threatening to seize the plant through the power of 
eminent domain. Gulf and Western capitulated, the facility sold, and the jobs 
remained in New Bedford. 
In addition to these early corporate and community campaigns, labor 
innovated in a number of areas, including running what were called inside 
campaigns. At Moog Automotive, under the leadership of UAW staff represen-
tative Jerry Tucker, workers stayed on the job and worked without a contract 
and were able to exert tremendous pressure on the production process, forcing 
a settlement (Metzgar 1985). This was part of a return to local militancy by 
trade unionists wanting to play more of a role in their future through direct 
action rather than waiting for the wheels of a largely dysfunctional industrial 
relations system to slowly turn. 
While each of these tactics held tremendous promise, the wreckage of the 
1980s demonstrated that none of these approaches was the silver bullet labor 
was hoping for. Not all companies had boards that were as highly leveragable 
as the Stevens board, not all companies were located in places where com-
munity pressure could be generated, and, in areas where community pressure 
could be counted on, firms were not as vulnerable to that kind of pressure 
as Gulf and Western was in New Bedford. In-plant strategies also required 
tremendous worker discipline and solidarity and also depended on corporate 
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commitment to that specific site or facility. If either the work site or the work-
ers themselves were expendable, then even the most militant and united inside 
action would be rendered entirely ineffective. 
By the beginning of the 1990s, the lessons were clear. There would be no 
single route to labor's revival, and, in fact, campaigns that focused on only 
one issue or approach were doomed to fail. Instead, what began to emerge was 
that, given the changes taking place in corporate structure with the emergence 
of global firms, only multifaceted campaigns—campaigns that brought lever-
age on employers in multiple areas—would succeed. Perhaps the best example 
was the Steelworkers campaign against Japanese-owned tire giant Bridge-
stone/Firestone (BSFS). 
Table 1.1 shows that production at BSFS was truly global, with plants lo-
cated around the world. Distribution was global as well, and the Steelworkers 
were up against a firm that looked very different from U.S. Steel. Given these 
facts, the older approaches of selective strikes and pattern bargaining were no 
longer applicable. 
The Steelworkers used lessons learned from their seminal victory in. the 
twenty-two month lockout at Ravenswood Aluminum (Juravich and Bron-
fenbrenner 1999) and built a comprehensive strategic campaign at Bridge-
stone/Firestone that was anything but one-dimensional. It focused on major 
stockholders and lenders, mounted an ambitious end-user campaign pressur-
ing consumers not to buy BSFS tires, built broad alliances with religious and 
civil rights leaders, and, as part of an ambitious international campaign, sent 
worker delegations to Japan (Juravich and Bronfenbrenner 2003). 
As in the Ravenswood campaign, the basic modus operandi was to con-
stantly escalate the campaign, starting new fronts against the company as other 
fronts were waning. In the words of former US WA president George Becker, 
The last thing I wanted the company ... to think of before [they] went to 
bed at night, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, Saturday and 
Sunday night... is all the problems and difficulties we caused them that day. 
And the first thing I wanted them to think of when they wake up is, "Oh 
Christ, I've got to go out and face them sons of bitches again." ... We had 
to get them thinking about the Steelworkers continually, every day ... if we 
let an hour go by that our name didn't cross their minds for some reason or 
another, then we were failing. (Juravich and Bronfenbrenner 1999,132) 
Using this approach, the Steelworkers were able to win at BSFS, demon-
strating the power of strategic research and comprehensive campaigns against 
even global giants. This kind of multifaceted strategic campaign was pre-
cisely the form of resistance needed in this new corporate environment. Key 
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of rank-and-file workers. Early corporate campaigns tended to marginalize 
rank-and-file workers, which was problematic. In fact, neither of these cam-
paigns could have been won without the rank-and-file militancy that kept 
scabs out of the plants and kept the heat on the employer locally (Juravich 
and Bronfenbrenner 1999; Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 2001). Yet it is also 
important to note that, against global giants like BSFS, local militancy alone 
was not enough. We saw this in a number of battles that unions lost in the 
1980s and 1990s. Workers stood tall, kept scabs out, and engaged in coura-
geous actions, but without some larger strategic campaign to leverage the 
firm, the local militancy alone, which might have been enough at Lawrence, 
was no longer sufficient. 
A Model for Strategic Corporate Research 
Tracing the evolution of strategic campaigns provides an important founda-
tion to lay out a model and framework for conducting strategic corporate re-
search.2 Several things have become clear. First, strategic corporate research is 
not just random information gathering on employers. This is not just research 
for its own sake but research directed both at understanding how power flows 
in firms and at identifying vulnerabilities and potential points of leverage. Sec-
ond, strategic corporate research is not simply about "digging up dirt" on em-
ployers to use in more traditional bargaining and organizing campaigns. As we 
have seen from our analysis of the evolution of corporate structure, gathering 
dirt to use in old-style campaigns has little chance for success against today's 
global giants. Strategic research needs to be the first step in developing the 
kinds of multifaceted strategic campaigns that are necessary to win today. 
In reviewing the small amount of material on corporate research, the only 
common analytical tool is what has been called a power analysis or web analy-
sis. It typically involves placing the target firm in the center of a page and then 
brainstorming any and all connections to top management, board members, 
customers, community groups, and the like, and placing them in a large circle 
around the firm linked by arrows. 
While it is a powerful brainstorming tool for initial thinking about a cor-
poration, the web analysis has a number of limitations. First, it does not dis-
tinguish between what is inside the firm and what is outside. Management is 
inside the firm, while environmental groups are outside. This is important be-
2
 This framework and materials were developed with the consultation of Kate Bronfen-
brenner of Cornell University and Keith Mestrich, formerly of the AFL-CIO and now with 
UNITE HERE. I was fortunate to have worked with them for several years in helping to develop 
the curriculum for and teach in the Cornell University/AFL-CIO Strategic Corporate Research 
Summer School. 
